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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

98(b) (2) states that when an action involves a public official's action,
venue is proper in the county where the officers performed the action.
The court found the substance of Colorado Springs' complaint directed at the official actions of the Board and that venue was proper
where the official actions occurred, Pueblo County.
C.R.C.P. 98(a) states that venue is proper in the county in which
the subject of the action, or a substantial part thereof, is situated if the
subject of the claim affects real property, franchises, or utilities. The
court found that the term "affects" means the subject of the claim must
relate to title, lien, injury, or possession of the property, franchises, or
utilities. Colorado Springs' requested relief was directed at the validity
of county land use regulations. Thus, the claim was not directed to the
title, lien, injury, or possession of the property, franchises, or utilities
and C.R.C.P. 98(a) did not apply.
The court held venue for the action challenging validity of land use
regulations was properly in Pueblo County District Court.
Michael S. Samelson
Cherokee Metro. Dist. v. Simpson, 148 P.3d 142 (Colo. 2006)
(holding that a stipulated provision of a conditional water rights diligence decree precludes the district's use of wells designated for "emergency" and "backup" purposes as a primary source when its commitments outside the designated basin increased after entering into the
stipulation).
Cherokee Metropolitan District ("Cherokee"), a metropolitan water district that supplied water to homes and businesses east of Colorado Springs, used two sets of wells in the Upper Black Squirrel Creek
Designated Ground Water Basin ("Designated Basin") known as
Cherokee Wells 1-8 ("Wells 1-8") in the north and Sweetwater wells in
the south. Cherokee provided water to lands both within and without
the Designated Basin. In March, 1999, the Colorado District Court,
Water Division 2 granted a due diligence decree for ten Sweetwater
conditional water rights that Cherokee obtained from predecessors-ininterest. At the same time, the district court incorporated an agreement between Cherokee and the Upper Black Squirrel Creek Ground
Water Management District ("Management District") that included a
stipulated provision which allowed Cherokee to use Wells 1-8 for inbasin beneficial use that discharged unused water back into the Designated Basin. The parties included in the stipulation two exceptions for
"emergency use" and "backup" purposes, which the provision further
explained would include the inability to get sufficient supply from the
Sweetwater wells.
At the time the parties entered into the agreement, Cherokee predicted the Sweetwater wells would produce over 6000 acre-feet annually. The district court held that the wells had a capacity of 3407 acre-
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feet. At the time of the parties' agreement, Cherokee's commitments
for water supply were 2683 acre-feet annually. The current demand
has increased up to 4,944.02 acre-feet annually because of escalated
growth outside the Designated Basin. The stipulated decree also allowed Cherokee to obtain additional rights to divert an extra 10,000
acre-feet from the Designated Basin, but this option was more expensive than utilizing Wells 1-8.
Cherokee instituted this action against the Management District,
the State Engineer, and the Colorado Ground Water Commission,
claiming that the "emergency" and "backup" exceptions allowed
Cherokee to use Wells 1-8 as a primary supply for its commitments outside the Designated Basin. The district court held the stipulated provision to allow Cherokee to use Wells 1-8 only for emergency and backup
purposes when the Sweetwater wells proved insufficient for commitments that existed at the time the parties entered into the agreement.
Cherokee appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court.
Facing the increased demand and insufficient Sweetwater supply,
Cherokee argued that the exceptions for emergency and backup allowed the use of Wells 1-8 as a primary source for its commitments outside the Designated Basin. In examining the plain language of the
provision, the court upheld the district court's interpretation that
Cherokee could use Wells 1-8 only on a temporary basis when its
Sweetwater wells could not provide sufficient supply for the commitments outside the Designated Basin. The court held that Cherokee's
interpretation of the provision frustrated the stipulated decree provision's purpose to keep water from Wells 1-8 in the Designated Basin.
The court held that, although the parties could have designated Wells
1-8 as available primary sources for Cherokee in the event the Sweetwater wells did not perform as predicted, nothing in the plain language suggested that was the parties' intent.
Further, the court upheld the district court's reading of the stipulation that the agreement referred to Cherokee's commitments outside
the Designated Basin that existed at the time of the agreement. The
court held that neither the intent of the parties nor the plain language
of the stipulation provided that Cherokee could employ Wells 1-8 for
out-of-basin use when its commitments increased due to further development. Rather, the court noted the parties were both concerned with
limiting the exportation of water outside the Designated Basin at the
time of agreement.
The court affirmed the district court's judgment that the stipulated
decree provision provided that Wells 1-8 may be used to supply water
outside the Designated Basin only for emergency and backup purposes
when its Sweetwater wells were unable to produce a sufficient supply to
meet Cherokee's commitments that existed at the time the parties entered into the stipulation.
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In a dissenting opinion, Justice Coats disagreed with the court's interpretation of the stipulation in favor of the Management District. He
argued that the record did not support the characterization of the
emergency and backup exceptions as temporary. Additionally, Justice
Coats suggested that when both the district court and the majority determined the parties' intent in agreeing to the stipulation, they ignored evidence of Cherokee's interest in maintaining an adequate
secondary supply through Wells 1-8.
Ryan Malarky

HAWAII
In re Water Use Permit Applications, 147 P.3d 839 (Haw. 2006)
(holding that the intermediate court of appeals has jurisdiction over
appeals filed after July 1, 2006 regarding the Water Commission decisions).
Hakipu'u 'Ohana, Ka Lahui Hawai'i and Hawai'i's Thousand
Friends appealed the Water Commission's decision regarding the use
of water from the Wai hole ditch system. Appellants filed the appeal on
August 11, 2006 with the Supreme Court of Hawai'i pursuant to Haw.
Rev. Stat. § 174C-60 (1993) which grants the supreme court jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Water Commission. The supreme court
ordered the appeal to be rescheduled with the intermediate appellate
court pursuant to the newly enacted Haw. Rev. Stat. § 602-57(1), which
provides the intermediate appellate court jurisdiction over appeals
from any agency absent a law to the contrary. The new statute became
effective onJuly 1, 2006.
The court determined that the legislature's failure to include Haw.
Rev. Stat. § 174C-60 in the list of fifty-three statutes amended by the
recent Haw. Rev. Stat..§ 602-5(a)(1) was merely an oversight. The
court reasoned that it could resolve the oversight by applying a provision in the new statute which grants jurisdiction over all agency appeals
to the intermediate appellate court. The court further used the rules
of statutory construction to find that, where the laws are inconsistent
with one another, the legislature will be deemed to have changed the
preceding law to be in conformity with the new statute. Therefore,
despite the legislature's failure to expressly amend the older statute,
which grants jurisdiction of Water Commission appeals only to the supreme court, the court held that the intermediate appellate court has
jurisdiction over such appeals effective July 1, 2006.
Accordingly, the court ordered that the appeal be docketed with
the intermediate court of appeals nunc pro tunc to October 10, 2006.
Diane O'Neil

